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Civil Procedure.  Puerini v. LaPierre, 208 A.3d 1157 (R.I. 2019). 
Plaintiffs were unable to hold a corporate vehicle title owner 
vicariously liable for a motor vehicle accident because an enabling 
Rhode Island statute was preempted by the federal Graves 
Amendment through the doctrine of conflict preemption.  Plaintiffs’ 
objection to the hearing justice’s decision that granted summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant failed because Plaintiffs introduced 
an argument that was waived on appeal.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On April 25, 2008, Jason Puerini was driving his motorcycle in 
North Smithfield, Rhode Island when he collided with an 
automobile that pulled out of a parking lot in front of him.1  As a 
result of the collision, Puerini suffered multiple serious injuries.2  
In 2011, Puerini and his wife, Andrea Puerini (Plaintiffs), filed a 
multi-count suit in Providence County Superior Court against five 
defendants: Jeanne LaPierre (LaPierre), the driver of the 
automobile, LaPierre’s sister, Priscilla MacPherson (MacPherson), 
who co-leased the vehicle LaPierre was driving at the time of the 
incident, and the sisters’ insurer, Amica Mutual Insurance 
Company.3  Plaintiffs also brought suit against Metro Motors, the 
corporate entity from which the sisters originally leased the vehicle, 
and Honda Lease Trust (HLT), the corporate entity that held title 
to the vehicle and that was the lessor of the vehicle at the time of 
the collision.4  Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that LaPierre 
negligently caused Puerini’s injuries and that the corporate entities 
were vicariously liable for LaPierre’s negligent conduct, as well as 
1. Puerini v. LaPierre, 208 A.3d 1157, 1160 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id.
3. Id.  Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against Amica Mutual
Insurance Company within a few months of filing the complaint.  Id. at 1160 
n.1.
4. Id.
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for the loss of consortium alleged to be suffered by Puerini’s wife 
and children.5 
In 2013, the Superior Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to 
amend their complaint, and Plaintiffs asserted that while executing 
the lease agreement, the corporate defendants placed MacPherson, 
not LaPierre, as the primary lessee to the vehicle based on 
LaPierre’s inability to secure financing based on her credit history.6  
This action taken by the corporate defendants was unbeknownst to 
the sisters.7  Based on this assertion, Plaintiffs added new legal 
theories in their complaint, alleging that the corporate defendants 
violated the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act,8 
committed fraud,9 violated the Federal Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act,10 and were subject to civil liability.11  Additionally, Plaintiffs 
alleged common law theories of fraud and negligence, and 
reasserted their claims for loss of consortium.12  Plaintiffs also 
reasserted legal theories against the corporate defendants, alleging 
vicarious liability pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws sections 
31-33-6 and 31-33-7.13
HLT answered the amended complaint with an affirmative
defense, contending that Plaintiffs’ theories of liability were 
“preempted by federal law.”14  From August 2013 to July 2015, both 
HLT and Metro Motors filed multiple summary judgment 
motions.15  In July 2015 a hearing was held on Metro Motor’s 
summary judgment motion, and in September 2015, a hearing was 
held on HLT’s summary judgment motion.16  In both of these 
proceedings, the hearing justice granted the corporate defendants’ 
summary judgment motions.17  The hearing justice remanded the 
5. Id. at 1160.
6. Id. at 1160–61.
7. Id. at 1161.
8. See 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-1.
9. See 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-1.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
11. Puerini, 208 A.3d at 1161; see 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-2.





17. Id.  Plaintiffs then filed “a premature notice of appeal” which was
corrected because of an “effort between the parties and the hearing justice . . . 
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case to the Superior Court and in June 2017 a final judgment on 
both of these hearings was entered.18   
Plaintiffs appealed the granting of summary judgment, but 
after the case was placed on “the regular calendar for full briefing 
and argument,” the status of the appeal changed;19 Plaintiffs 
withdrew their appeal against Metro Motors and acquiesced in 
their claim against LaPierre and MacPherson following the sisters’ 
proceedings in bankruptcy court that deemed them to be “judgment 
proof.”20  Accordingly, the only remaining claims on appeal were 
against HLT “as title owner of the vehicle and against LaPierre to 
the extent of her insurance coverage.”21   
Based on the aforementioned travel, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court (the Court) focused its analysis on Plaintiffs’ allegations 
against HLT that the corporate defendant, as title owner of the 
vehicle, was vicariously liable for the injuries Plaintiffs had 
sustained.22  Plaintiffs objected to HLT’s position that the federal 
Graves Amendment23 preempts Rhode Island statutes intended to 
impose vicarious liability on title owners of vehicles.  Plaintiffs also 
argued that an issue of material fact existed and that the hearing 
justice should not have granted HLT’s summary judgment 
motion.24   
to ensure that plaintiffs ultimately filed a timely notice of appeal.”   Id. 1161 
n.2.
18. Id. at 1161 n.2.
19. Id. at 1161.
20. Id. at 1161, 1161 n.3.
21. Id. at 1161 n.3.  “The plaintiffs state in their brief that Amica Mutual
Insurance Company, LaPierre’s insurer, has offered the policy limit of 
$100,000 per person; plaintiffs have not yet accepted the offer or released its 
claims against LaPierre.”  Id. 
22. Id. at 1162.
23. Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a):
In general—An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the 
vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable 
under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason 
of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm 
to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, 
or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, 
if— (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade 
or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no 
negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an 
affiliate of the owner). 
24. Puerini, 208 A.3d at 1162.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In determining whether HLT was vicariously liable for the 
Plaintiffs’ injuries, the Court engaged in a two-part inquiry.25  
First, the Court analyzed whether the Rhode Island state statutes 
that would impose vicarious liability “on title owners of motor 
vehicles for the negligence of their lessees,” were preempted by the 
federal Graves Amendment.26  Second, the Court reviewed the 
Superior Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of 
HLT.27 
A. Federal Preemption of State Law
The Court first explained that statutory interpretations are
reviewed de novo.28  Then, the Court cited to the Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution29 as determinative in 
establishing whether state law is preempted by federal law.30  The 
Court noted that preemption of state law by federal law can occur 
in three different ways—express preemption, field preemption, or 
conflict preemption.31  The Court focused its analysis on conflict 
preemption.  Conflict preemption occurs when the intended purpose 
and effect of a federal statute reflects a legislative intent to preempt 
state laws.32  Conflict preemption arises when “compliance with 
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,”33 
“and where under the circumstances of a particular case, the 
challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
25. Id. at 1162, 1166.
26. Id. at 1162–66.
27. Id. at 1166–68.
28. Id. at 1162.
29. Id.  The Supremacy Clause provides,
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
30. Puerini, 208 A.3d at 1163.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963)). 
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and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”34  To 
determine whether the state statutes were in conflict preemption 
with federal law, the Court compared relevant sections35 of title 31 
of the Rhode Island General Laws with the federal Graves 
Amendment.36   
The Court referred to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
summary of the Graves Amendment which classified paragraph (a) 
as the “preemption clause”37 and paragraph (b) as providing “two 
savings clauses.”38  Further, the Court referenced other appellate 
courts that have engaged in statutory analysis concerning the effect 
of the Graves Amendment and concluded that paragraph (a) 
“preempts state laws imposing vicarious liability on car rental or 
leasing agencies for the negligent acts of these agencies’ lessees,” 
and that paragraph (b) preserves the states’ laws that “impose 
mandatory insurance—or insurance-like requirements—as a 
condition of operating as a rental or leasing agency and to provide 
consequences for failure to comply with such insurance 
requirements.”39 
The Court then began its statutory analysis of Rhode Island 
General Laws sections 31-33-6 and 31-33-7.40  The Court noted that 
it had previously acknowledged the intended purpose of section 31-
33-6 is to “ensure that a victim of a car injury has an avenue of
recovery.”41  Further, the Court has previously held that the effect
34. Id. (quoting Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
373 (2000)). 
35. 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-33-6, 31-33-7, 31-34-1, 31-42-2, 31-34-4.
36. Puerini, 208 A.3d at 1164.
37. See 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a).
38. Id. at 1164; see 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)
Financial responsibility laws.—Nothing in this section supersedes the 
law of any State or political subdivision thereof— (1) imposing 
financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a 
motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor 
vehicle; or (2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the 
trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to 
meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements 
under State law. 
39. Puerini, 208 A.3d at 1164.
40. Id.  The Court determined that section 31-33-7 was “not pertinent to
the preemptive effect of the Graves Amendment.”  Id. at 1164 n.5. 
41. Id. at 1165 (quoting Hough v. McKiernan, 108 A.3d 1030, 1037 (R.I.
2015)). 
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of section 31-33-6 is to hold the owner of a motor vehicle “vicariously 
liable for the acts of another driver who drives with the owner’s 
consent unless that driver furnished proof of financial 
responsibility before the accident.”42  Thus, the Court held that, 
because section 31-33-6 is intended to be a financial responsibility 
statute which legally obliges vehicle leasing and rental businesses 
to meet liability insurance requirements, the statute falls within 
the scope of the Graves Amendment paragraph (b) “savings clause” 
classification.43  Therefore, the Court held that section 31-33-6 is 
not preempted by the Graves Amendment.44   
Next, the Court turned to the Defendant’s original argument 
for summary judgment, which asserted that sections 31-34-1 and 
31-34-445 were preempted by the Graves Amendment.46  The Court
held that section 31-34-1 was not impacted by the Graves
Amendment because the statute does not “address liability.”47
The Court then held that section 31-34-4, which does address 
vicarious liability, “clearly conflicts with the Graves Amendment, 
§ 30106(a),” and thus was preempted by the federal statute.48 The
Court reasoned that section 31-34-4 establishes liability on any title
owner when damage by the vehicle operator is caused by
negligence, regardless of whether or not the driver has provided
proof of financial responsibility.49  Accordingly, the Court held,
section 31-34-4 falls within the Graves Amendment paragraph (a)
“preemption clause” classification.50
42. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-4(a):
Any owner of a for hire motor vehicle or truck who has given proof of 
financial responsibility under this chapter or who in violation of this 
chapter has failed to give proof of financial responsibility, shall be 
jointly and severally liable with any person operating the vehicle for 
any damages caused by the negligence of any person operating the 
vehicle by or with the permission of the owner. 
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 Lastly, the Court addressed the statutory argument Plaintiffs 
raised in objection to HLT’s summary judgment motion.51  
Plaintiffs contended that because the Rhode Island General 
Assembly intended for the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act 
(MVRA)52 to be a financial responsibility law, seeking to provide 
persons injured in motor vehicle accidents with compensation, it 
should not be preempted by the federal Graves Amendment.53  
Defendant’s argued that MVRA is not a vicarious liability statute 
because the statute “requires owners to have insurance but does not 
impose vicarious liability as a consequence for failure to comply 
with its mandatory insurance provisions.”54  The Court has 
previously articulated that the legislative intent of the MVRA is to 
provide individuals injured by motor vehicle accidents with 
opportunity for redress.55  The Court went on to define the portion 
of the MVRA that addresses “proof of financial security”56 and held 
that because the penalties for violating57 the financial security 
portion of MVRA did not impose vicarious tort liability, it therefore 
does not conflict with the federal Graves Amendment.58  Thus, the 
Court found that the MVRA is not preempted by the paragraph (a) 
of the federal Graves Amendment.59 
B. Summary Judgment
The Court then reviewed the hearing justice’s decision to grant
HLT’s summary judgment motion.60  The Court stated it would only 
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1162; see 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-47-1:
. . . (a) This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Motor 
Vehicle Reparation Act.’ (b) The legislature is concerned over the 
rising toll of motor vehicle accidents and the suffering and loss 
inflicted by them.  The legislature has determined that it is a matter 
of grave concern that motorists shall be financially able to respond in 
damages for their negligent acts, so that innocent victims of motor 
vehicle accidents may be recompensed for the injury and financial loss 
inflicted upon them. 
53. Puerini, 208 A.3d at 1162.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1165–66.
56. See 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-47-2(15).
57. See 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-47-9.
58. Puerini, 208 A.3d at 1166.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1161.
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affirm the hearing justice’s determination if, “after reviewing the 
admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”61  
The Court then explained that the Plaintiffs bear the burden to 
demonstrate that a disputed material fact exists.62  The Court 
noted it was undisputed that HLT, in being the title owner of the 
vehicle LaPierre was driving in the motor vehicle accident, was 
considered the owner of the vehicle pursuant to section 31-33-6.63  
The Court also noted there was no dispute over whether HLT 
complied with Rhode Island’s mandatory insurance laws because 
LaPierre’s lease agreement with HLT included details of her 
insurance policy.64   
On appeal, Plaintiffs tried to argue, for the first time, that HLT 
provided “contradictory information” during different stages of the 
case.65  First, Plaintiffs asserted that during the pleading stage of 
the case in HLT’s response to Plaintiffs amended complaint, HLT 
affirmed that “at all times relevant hereto [HLT] was in the 
business of leasing long term vehicles to residents in Rhode 
Island.”66  Then, Plaintiffs argued that HLT provided a conflicting 
response to an interrogatory conducted during the discovery stage 
of the case.67  When Plaintiffs inquired during interrogatory about 
whether HLT was required to adhere to state laws or regulations 
“relative to the financing or leasing of a motor vehicle,” HLT 
answered by stating it “was not involved in the financing or leasing 
[of] motor vehicles from 2005–2006,” and was only “the owner of 
some vehicles.”68  The Court held that Plaintiffs waived this 
argument on appeal “by not raising it in the trial court for the 
hearing justice’s consideration.”69 
61. Id. at 1161–62.
62. Id. at 1162.
63. Id. at 1167.  See 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-33-6 (“For the purposes of this
section, the term ‘owner’ shall include any person, firm, copartnership, 
association, or corporation having the lawful possession or control of a motor 
vehicle under a written sale agreement.” (emphasis added)). 





69. Id. at 1167.
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The Court noted that even if Plaintiffs did not waive their 
argument on appeal, this new argument would not have changed 
the outcome on appeal.70  Instead, the Court expressed that HLT’s 
discrepant responses “would not have demonstrated a genuine 
issue of material fact.”71  The Court reasoned that the facts of the 
case already impliedly demonstrated that HLT was not directly 
responsible for the financing and leasing procedures that lead up to 
the final signed lease agreement, and that Metro Motors, as a 
business subsidiary, served that purpose.72  The Court found that 
this information did not change the position and that HLT was 
“engaged in the general business of leasing motor vehicles,” and 
was thus covered within the scope of the Graves Amendment.73  
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision and 
held that “HLT was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ 
claims that it is vicariously liable for their injuries.”74 
COMMENTARY 
The Court properly precluded Plaintiffs’ attempt to highlight 
discrepancies within HLT’s responses about their status or 
involvement in the business of leasing and renting vehicles.75  As 
procedural rules dictate, a petitioner on appeal for summary 
judgment cannot present new evidence, thus the Court made the 
correct determination in barring Plaintiffs’ argument.  While the 
Court provides a persuasive hypothetical interpretation of how 
Plaintiffs’ argument, if not waived on appeal, would have had 
minimal impact on the outcome of the Court’s decision, there is 
room for a different interpretation.76  Contrarily, whether or not 
HLT was classified as a “dealer in the business of leasing motor 
vehicles” could indeed have been considered a material fact that 
might have an impact on whether the corporate defendant is 
protected from liability within the scope of the Graves 
Amendment.77  The Court rested its reasoning on the surrounding 
70. Id. at 1167–68.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1168.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1167.
76. Id. at 1167–68.
77. Id.
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facts of the case—Metro Motors, as a business subsidiary, was, 
“directly responsible for the procedures leading up to the signed 
lease agreement and the assignment thereof to HLT.”78  While this 
is true, given the nature of this case, and the unique focus on 
language when engaging in statutory interpretation, it is possible 
that Plaintiffs would have met their burden of proving a genuine 
issue of material fact.79  Specifically, because HLT admitted in an 
interrogatory that it “was not in the business of leasing or renting 
motor vehicles at the time LaPierre signed the lease for the vehicle 
involved in the accident,” the corporate defendant could have been 
precluded from summary judgment.80  Consequently, if HLT was 
not classified under section 30106(b)(2) of the Graves Amendment 
as a business entity “engaged in the trade or business of renting or 
leasing motor vehicles,”81 or under Rhode Island General Laws 
section 31-47-2(4) as a “dealer engaged in the business of leasing 
motor vehicles,” 82 then there is room for debate as to whether the 
laws applied would have yielded a different outcome for Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held, pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause of the Sixth Amendment, that Rhode Island 
General Laws § 31-34-4, which intends to hold corporate title 
owners of leased vehicles vicariously liable, is preempted by the 
federal Graves Amendment under the conflict preemption 
doctrine.83  The Court affirmed the decision of the superior court 
hearing justice granting HLT’s summary judgment motion.84  
Rachel E. Dunham 
78. Id. at 1168.
79. Id. at 1161–62.
80. Id. at 1162.
81. Id. at 1163.
82. Id. at 1166.
83. Id. at 1162–63, 1165.
84. Id. at 1168.
